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Impact of Federal Government Budget Deficits on the Longer Term Real Interest Rate in the 
U.S.: Evidence Using Annual and Quarterly Data, 1960-2013 
 
By Richard J. Cebula, Jacksonville University 
 
1 Introduction 
 
There was a brief experience of federal government budget surpluses in the U.S. during the FY1998 
through FY2001 period. However, given the 2001 recession, sluggish economic growth following 
2001, and budgetary demands involving income tax cuts during the Bush Administration as well as 
the “war on terrorism” in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on U.S. soil on September 11, 2001, the 
prospect and reality of large federal government budget deficits reappeared during FY 2002. As 
Krueger (2003) observed, federal budget deficits in the U.S. re-emerged as a major economic concern 
by 2003. These budget deficits increases were subsequently exacerbated due to various factors, 
including the “wars” and military conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as in Pakistan. Moreover, 
during and in the aftermath of the so-called “Great Recession,” factors such as the $787 billion 
“stimulus package” passed by the U.S. Congress under newly inaugurated President Obama in 
February, 2009 and the massive expansion of the food stamp program (now referred to as “SNAP,” 
for “supplemental nutritional assistance program”) and Medicaid (health care for the poor),  those 
budget deficits have risen to all-time highs since the experience of World War II, logically making 
them an even greater economic concern.  
 The impact of central government budget deficits on interest rate yields has been studied 
extensively. This is especially true for the case for federal budget deficits in the U.S. but applies to 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
other nations as well, including G8 nations such as the United Kingdom, Italy, Germany, and France 
and non-G8 nations such as Greece. This literature is especially rich since the early 1980s (Al-Saji, 
1992, 1993; Barth, Iden and Russek, 1984, 1985, 1986; Cebula, 1992, 1997, 2005, 2013; Cebula and 
Cuellar, 2010; Ewing and Yanochik, 1999; Findlay, 1990; Gale and Orszag, 2003; Gissey, 1999; 
Hoelscher, 1983, 1986; Johnson, 1992; Kiani, 2009;Ostrosky, 1990; Saltz, 1998; Swamy, Kolluri, 
and Singamsetti, 1990; Tanzi, 1985; Zahid, 1988). Interestingly, a commonplace finding by most of 
these studies is that federal/central government budget deficits raise longer term interest rate yields 
while not significantly affecting short term rate yields. Since capital formation is presumably much 
more affected by longer term than by short term rates, it has been argued in certain other studies that 
budget deficits may lead to the "crowding out" of private investment, particularly in the form of 
“transactions crowding out” (Carlson and Spencer, 1975; Cebula, 1997; Ewing and Yanochik, 1999; 
Gale and Orszag, 2003).  
 During recent years, the impact of budget deficits on interest rate yields has received only 
limited attention in the literature. Accordingly, in view of the resurgence of large federal budget 
deficits in the U.S., this exploratory study seeks to provide updated evidence as to the effect of the 
federal budget deficit on the ex post real interest rate yield on ten year Treasury notes, i.e., on the 
longer term (as opposed to shorter term) ex post real interest rate yield.  
 Unlike most previous studies, the present empirical analysis investigates this deficit/interest 
rate issue for a period exceeding the last half century, i.e., this study considers the issue in question 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
over a relatively long time frame, one beginning with the year 1960. Furthermore, focusing on a 
longer term real interest rate rather than a longer term nominal interest rate reflects the fact that 
private-sector, i.e., firms’, investment is presumably much more influenced by real than by nominal 
interest rates. Related to this perspective, consider the observation by Cecchetti (2006, p. 555), that 
“…the economic decisions of households to save and of firms to invest depend on the real interest 
rate…” Similarly, Mishkin (2013, p. 609) observes the traditional view is that “…a fall in real 
interest rates…lowers the cost of borrowing, causing a rise in investment spending…and consumer 
durable expenditure…” According to the “conventional wisdom” then,  the higher the ex post real 
longer term rate of interest, the lower the present value of investment for firms and hence the lower 
the rate of investment in new plant and equipment, ceteris paribus. In addition, consumer 
purchases of durable goods (especially housing), is likely also a decreasing function of the ex post 
real longer term rate of interest, ceteris paribus. Thus, it follows that the higher the ex post real 
longer term interest rate, the lower the expected level of economic activity (Taylor, 1999) as a 
result of "crowding out" of private investment and consumer durable goods purchases (Carlson and 
Spencer, 1975; Cebula, 1997; Ewing and Yanochik, 1999; Gale and Orszag, 2003).  
 Furthermore, the focus of this study is on the ex post real interest rate rather than the ex ante 
real interest rate. This is because there is controversy regarding the choice/specification of an 
inflation-expectations variable (Swamy, Kolluri, and Singamsetti, 1990; Cebula, 1998). For example, 
one possible way to measure expected future inflation is provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Philadelphia (2013) in the form of the well-known Livingston survey data of expected future inflation. 
However, as observed by Swamy, Kolluri, and Singamsetti (1990, p. 1013), there may be serious 
problems with the Livingston series: 
 Studies by some psychologists have shown that the heuristics people have available for 
forming expectations cannot be expected to automatically produce expectations that come 
anywhere close to satisfying the normative constraints on subjective probability judgments 
provided by the Bayesian theoryfailure to obey these constraints makes Livingstondata 
incompatible withstochastic law...  
 
 Accordingly, the present study defines the real rate of interest solely in terms of the ex post real rate. 
 Using annual data, this study initially investigates the period 1960 through 2013 in order to 
provide at least preliminary contemporary insights into whether federal budget deficits have elevated 
real longer term interest rates in the U.S. over an extended time period. Section 2 of this study 
provides the loanable funds framework adopted, and Section 3 defines the specific variables in the 
empirical model and describes the data. Using that data, Section 4 provides the empirical results of 
autoregressive, two stage least squares (2SLS) estimations in terms of the ex post real ten year U.S. 
Treasury note rate for the 1960-2013 time period. As a modest test of the robustness of the results and 
model over time, the model is subsequently estimated with annual data for two additional time 
periods, 1971-2013 and 1980-2013. In Section 5, an additional set of estimation results is provided 
for the period 1960-2013, in this case involving quarterly data; this estimation is used to confirm yet 
again the basic conclusions found in the initial estimation (one that used annual data). Conclusions 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
are found Section 6.1 
2 The Framework: Determinants of the Ex Post Real Interest Rate Yield on Ten Year U.S. 
Treasury Notes 
 
Based extensively on Barth, Iden, and Russek (1984; 1985; 1986) and Hoelscher (1986), as well as 
Al-Saji (1993) and Cebula (1997), to identify the determinants of the ex post real interest rate yield 
on ten year Treasury notes, a loanable funds model is adopted in which the real longer term interest 
rate yield is, assuming all other bond markets are in equilibrium, determined by:   
  D + MY = TDEFY         (1) 
where: 
 D = private sector domestic demand for ten year Treasury notes; 
 MY = a measure of the relative magnitude of the domestic money supply (M2), expressed as 
a percent of GDP;  
                     
1 Interestingly, this study significantly extends a very recent exploratory note by Cebula (2013), 
which addressed the possible impact of deficits on the nominal interest rate yield on Moody’s 
Aaa-rated corporate bonds over the 1973-2012 period using annual data. Unlike the present study, 
the Cebula (2013) analysis does not adopt the ex post real interest rate yield on ten year Treasury 
notes as the dependent variable. Furthermore, unlike the present study, the study by Cebula (2013) 
also overlooks the first two years immediately following the U.S. abandonment of Bretton Woods 
(1971 and 1972) and does not consider the period from 1960 through 1970 either. Furthermore, 
also unlike the present study, the Cebula (2013) study contains (except for the change in per capita 
GDP variable) different explanatory variables, namely, expected inflation, the ex ante real three 
month T-bill rate, and the monetary base over GDP in lieu of the variables in equation (4) of the 
present study; furthermore, Cebula (2013) does not include an estimate involving quarterly data. 
Another very recent related study by Cebula and Foley (2013) addresses the impact of deficits on 
the nominal long term fixed-rate mortgage interest rate and its specification (including an expected 
inflation variable, a measure of the nominal cost of funds, and the real GDP growth rate), differs 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 TDEFY = the total federal budget deficit, expressed as a percent of GDP; 
 In this framework, it is hypothesized that: 
D = D (RTEN, RBaa, RTHREE, RTXFR, CHPCGDP), DRTEN > 0, DRBaa < 0, DRTHREE < 0,   
 DRTXFR < 0, DCHPCRGDP > 0        (2) 
where: 
RTEN = the annual average ex post real interest rate yield on ten year Treasury notes; 
RAaa = the annual average ex post real interest rate yield on Moody’s Baa-rated corporate bonds; 
RTHREE = the annual average ex post real interest rate yield on three year Treasury notes; 
RTXFR = the annual average ex post real interest rate yield on high grade municipal bonds; and 
CHPCRGDP = the change in per capita real GDP. 
 According to the model, the private sector demand for ten year notes is an increasing function 
of RTEN, ceteris paribus, since bond buyers prefer a higher real rate of return. On the other hand, the 
higher the ex post real interest rate yield on Moody’s Baa-rated corporate bonds, the lower the private 
sector demand for ten year Treasury notes as bond buyers at the margin substitute these corporate 
bonds for the Treasury notes, ceteris paribus. Similarly, the higher the ex post real interest rate yield 
on three year Treasury notes, the lower the demand for U.S. Treasury notes, ceteris paribus, as private 
investors substitute these notes for the ten year Treasury notes. Furthermore, the higher the real (tax 
free) interest rate yield on high grade municipal bonds, the lower the demand for ten year U.S. 
                                                                               
extensively from equation (4) of the present study. It also deals solely with the period 1970-2008.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Treasury notes, ceteris paribus, as private investors substitute high grade municipal bonds for the ten 
year Treasury notes. Finally, following Barth, Iden and Russek (1984) and Hoelscher (1986), the 
variable CHPCRGDP is included in the analysis to capture any accelerator effects of real GDP 
changes on aggregate investment demand. According to Barth, Iden, and Russek (1984) and 
Hoelscher (1986), the expected sign on this partial is positive. This is because as the CHPCRGDP 
rises, the available supply of private sector funds also rises, some of which is expected to be directed 
to the purchase of ten year Treasury issues. 
 Substituting equation (2) into equation (1) and solving for RTEN yields: 
 RTEN = f (TDEFY, MY, RBaa, RTHREE, RTXFR, CHPCRGDP)    
such that: fTDEFY > 0, fMY < 0 fRBaa > 0, fRTHREE > 0, fRTXFR  > 0, fCHPCRGDP < 0  (3)  
 The first of these expected signs is positive to reflect the conventional wisdom that when the 
government attempts to finance a budget deficit, it forces interest rate yields upwards as it competes 
with the private sector to attract funds, ceteris paribus. The expected sign on the money supply 
variable (MY) is negative because the greater the magnitude of the money supply relative to GDP, the 
greater the offset to new government debt issues, i.e., greater money supply availability presumably 
helps to offset the interest-rate effects of budget deficits, ceteris paribus. The hypothesized signs on 
the three partial derivatives fRBaa, fRTHREE, and fRTXFR are all positive. These hypothesized signs reflect 
the fact that ten year Treasury notes compete with (a) Moody’s Baa-rated bonds, (b) three year 
Treasury notes, and (c) high grade municipal bonds. Consequently, if the real interest rate yield rises 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
on either the Moody’s Baa-rated bond, or on the three year Treasury note, or on the high grade 
municipal bond,  so too must the real interest rate yield on ten year Treasury notes. Finally, given the 
expectation that DCHPCRGDP > 0 (Barth, Iden, and Russek, 1984; Hoelscher, 1986), it follows that the 
expected sign on the partial fCHPCGDP is negative, ceteris paribus.   
3 Variables and Annual Data: Ex Post Real Interest Rate Yield on Ten Year Treasury Notes 
Predicated upon the model shown above in equation (3), the estimations provided in this study 
involve the following model:  
 RTENt = α0 + α1 TDEFYt + α2 MYt-1 + α3 RBaa t + α4 RTHREEt + α5 RTXFRt-1  
 + α6 CHPRCGDPt-1 + α7 AR (1) + ut       (4) 
where:   
RTENt  = the ex post real average interest rate yield on ten year U.S. Treasury notes in year t, 
expressed as a percent per annum;  
α0 = constant term;  
TDEFYt = the ratio of the nominal federal budget deficit in year t to the nominal GDP in year t, 
expressed as a percent;  
MYt-1 = the ratio of the average nominal M2 money supply in year t-1 to the nominal GDP in year t-1, 
expressed as a percent;  
RBaat = the ex post real average interest rate yield on Moody’s Baa-rated corporate bonds in year t, 
expressed as a percent annum;  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RTHREEt = the ex post real average interest rate yield on three year U.S. Treasury notes in year t, 
expressed as a percent per annum; 
RTXFRt-1 = the ex post real average interest rate yield on high grade municipal bonds in year t-1, 
expressed as a percent per annum; 
CHPCRGDPt-1 = the change in per capita real (2005 dollars) GDP over year t-1;  
AR (1) = the autoregressive term; and 
ut = the stochastic error term.  
The expected signs on the coefficients in equation (4) are, as follows: 
 α1 > 0, α2 < 0, α3 > 0, α4 > 0, α5 >0, α6 < 0      (5) 
 The budget deficit and M2 money supply are scaled by GDP because the sizes of the budget 
deficit and money supply should be judged relative to the size of the economy (Ostrosky, 1990; 
Cebula, 1997; Saltz, 1998). As a reflection of the efficiency of U.S. financial markets. the dependent 
variable in this system, RTENt, is expressed as contemporaneous with three of the explanatory 
variables: the ex post real average annual interest rate yield on Moody’s Baa-rated corporate bonds, 
RBaat; the federal budget deficit, as a percent of GDP, TDEFYt; and the ex post real average annual 
interest rate yield on three-year Treasury notes, RTHREEt. Given these contemporaneous 
components of this specification, the possibility of simultaneity bias arises, which in turn mandates 
the adoption of instrumental variables. The instrument chosen for the variable RBaat was the 
two-year lag of the ex post real average annual interest rate yield on three-month U.S. Treasury bills, 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RTBRt-2; the instrument chosen for the deficit variable TDEFYt was the two-year lag of the 
percentage annual average civilian unemployment rate, URt-2; and the instrument chosen for the 
RTHREEt variable was the percentage growth rate of real GDP lagged two years, RGDPGRt-2. The 
choice of instruments was based on the finding that RTBRt-2 was highly correlated with the RBaat 
variable (r=0.856), the finding that URt-2 was highly correlated with the TDEFYt variable (r=0.604), 
and the finding that the RGDPGRt-2 was highly correlated with the variable RTHREEt (r=0.647), 
whereas these instruments were uncorrelated with the error terms in the system. The interest rate 
variable RTXFR was lagged one year to avoid multi-collinearity problems.   
 The data for all of the variables in this analysis were obtained from the Council of Economic 
Advisors (2013, Tables B-1, B-2, B-4, B-42, B-64, B-69, B-73, B-79, B-95) and the Federal Reserve 
System (2014). The group unit root test reveals that the variables in this model are stationary in levels 
for the 1960-2013 study period. Descriptive statistics for each of the variables in the model for the 
1960-2013 period are found in Table 1.  
4 Empirical Findings Using Annual Data 
Empirical findings involving annual data are provided in this section of the study for three time 
periods. The first is the longest time frame alluded to in the Introduction, namely, 1960-2013, 
covering over half a century (n=54). The second, whose purpose is in part to test the consistency and 
resiliency of the findings for this longer period, covers the years 1971-2013 (n=43). The final time 
frame investigated deals with the period 1980-2013 (n=34). 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Period 1960-2013 
The autoregressive 2SLS estimate of equation (4) is provided in Table 2, where estimated coefficients, 
t-values, and prob. values are provided and where the Newey and West (1986) heteroskedasticity 
correction has been adopted. In Table 2, all six of the estimated coefficients on the explanatory 
variables exhibit the expected signs, with four of these coefficients being statistically significant at 
the 1% level and one being statistically significant at the 10% level. Only the estimated coefficient on 
the variable CHPCRGDPt-1 fails to be statistically significant at the 10% level, a result found in Barth, 
Iden and Russek (1984), Hoelscher (1986), and elsewhere in the deficit-interest rate literature. The 
DW statistic is 1.95, so that there is no gross evidence of an autocorrelation problem. The J-statistic 
is statistically significant at the 5% level, attesting to the dependability of the estimation, while the 
instrument rank is 14. 
 For the 1960-2013 study period, the coefficient on the money supply variable, MYt-1, is 
negative but statistically significant at only the 10% level, implying, albeit weakly, that the higher the 
ratio of the M2 money supply relative to GDP, the lower the ex post real interest rate yield on ten year 
Treasury notes; clearly, this empirical result cannot be regarded as compelling empirical evidence of 
this impact of monetary policy. The coefficient on the ex post real interest rate yield on Moody’s 
Baa-rated corporate bonds (RBaat) is positive, as hypothesized, and statistically significant at the 1% 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
level, implying that the higher this ex post real interest rate yield, the higher the ex post real interest 
rate yield on ten year Treasury notes. This finding presumably reflects competition between long term 
corporate bonds and ten year Treasury notes. The estimated coefficient on the ex post real three year 
Treasury note interest rate yield is also positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, as 
hypothesized, implying that the higher the value of the variable RTHREEt, the higher the ex post real 
interest rate yield on ten year Treasury notes. This finding presumably is a consequence of market 
competition, in this case between three year and ten year Treasury notes. The estimated coefficient on 
the RTXFRt-1 variable is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, a finding also suggestive 
of market competition, in this instance between ten year Treasuries and high grade municipals. Thus, 
the higher the value of RTXFRt-1, the higher the value of RTENt. Finally, the coefficient on the 
budget deficit variable, TDEFYt, is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. Thus, the 
higher the federal budget deficit (as a percent of GDP), the higher the ex post real interest rate yield 
on ten year Treasury notes. This finding is in principle consistent with a variety of empirical studies 
of the U.S. involving earlier and shorter time periods, including Al-Saji (1993), Barth, Iden and 
Russek (1984, 1985, 1986), Cebula (1997, 2005, 2013), Cebula and Cuellar (2010), Findlay (1990), 
Gissey (1999), Hoelscher (1986), Kiani (2009), and Saltz (1998), among others.  
 For the interested reader, Table 3 provides the correlation matrix for the explanatory variables 
over the 1960-2013 study period. There is modest evidence of multi-collinearity, i.e., three cases out 
of 15 pairings. However, in all three cases, the explanatory variables involved are all statistically 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
significant at the 1% level in the estimation. Hence, there does not appear to exist a significant 
multi-collinearity problem in this model.  
The Period 1971-2013 
In order to test the consistency and resiliency of the findings for the 1960-2013 study period and 
arguably also to provide insight into the budget deficit-real interest rate yield relationship during a 
more recent time period, a second estimate of equation (4) is provided; in this estimate, the study 
period runs from 1971 through 2013. The choice of 1971 as the beginning of this alternative study 
period is the fact that the U.S. announced in August of 1971 that it was abandoning the Bretton 
Woods Agreement. For the interested reader, Table 4 provides descriptive statistics for the variables 
in the model for this study period.  In addition, it is observed that the group unit root test reveals that 
the variables in this model are stationary in levels for the 1971-2013 study period. 
 In any case, the autoregressive 2SLS estimate of equation (4) for the period 1971-2013 is 
provided in Table 5, where estimated coefficients, t-values, and prob. values are provided and where 
the Newey and West (1986) heteroskedasticity correction has again been adopted. In Table 5, all six 
of the estimated coefficients on the explanatory variables exhibit the expected signs, with four of 
these coefficients being statistically significant at the 1% level and two (CHPCRGDPt-1 and MYt-1) 
failing to be statistically significant at the 10% level. The DW statistic is 1.88, so that there is no 
evidence of an autocorrelation problem. The J-statistic is statistically significant at the 5% level, 
attesting to the dependability of the estimation. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The coefficient on the ex post real interest rate yield on Moody’s Baa-rated corporate bonds 
(RBaat) is positive and statistically significant at the 1%  level, implying that the higher this ex post 
real interest rate yield, the higher the ex post real interest rate yield on ten year Treasury notes. As 
observed earlier, this outcome presumably reflects competition between the markets for long term 
corporate bonds and ten year Treasury notes. The estimated coefficient on the ex post real three year 
Treasury note interest rate yield is also positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, implying 
that the higher the value of the variable RTHREEt, the higher the ex post real interest rate yield on ten 
year Treasury notes. Once again, this presumably is a consequence of market competition between 
these two Treasury notes in the financial marketplace. Similarly, the estimated coefficient on the 
RTXFRt-1 variable is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, so that the higher the value 
of RTXFRt-1, the higher the value of RTENt. As in the estimate for 1960-2013, this finding is 
suggestive of market competition, in this case between ten year Treasuries and high grade municipals. 
Finally, the coefficient on the federal budget deficit variable, TDEFYt, is positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. Thus, the higher the federal budget deficit (expressed as a percent of GDP), 
the higher the ex post real interest rate yield on ten year Treasury notes. Once again, this finding is 
consistent with a variety of empirical studies of earlier and shorter time periods, including those by 
Al-Saji (1993), Barth, Iden and Russek (1984, 1985, 1986), Cebula (1997, 2005, 2013), Cebula and 
Cuellar (2010), Findlay (1990), Hoelscher (1986), Kiani (2009), and Saltz (1998). Thus, it appears 
that the results for the 1971-2013 period are entirely consistent with those for the longer study period 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1960-2013, thereby lending greater credibility for the latter (exploratory) results. 
 
The Period 1980-2013 
As observed by Barth (1991), in March of 1980, the Congress passed and the President signed into 
law the most sweeping de-regulation of the U.S. banking industry in U.S. history. This de-regulation 
came in the form of the DIDMCA (the Depository Institutions De-regulation and Monetary Control 
Act of 1980). Among its many components was the provision phasing out (by April 1, 1986) of 
“Regulation Q,” which had set ceilings on the interest rates financial institutions in the U.S. could pay 
on deposits. Another provision of the DIDMCA was one that eliminated statutes prohibiting “usury,” 
thereby enabling interest rates to rise to true market values. Furthermore, this banking system 
de-regulation was further reinforced by the implementation of another federal statute, the GSDIA 
(Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982), which de-regulated savings and loan 
institutions and permitted them to issue adjustable rate mortgages. Thus, it is reasonable to scrutinize 
the budget deficit-real interest rate linkage in light of these developments in U.S. financial markets. 
For the interested reader, it is observed that the group unit root test reveals that the variables in this 
model are stationary in levels for the 1980-2013 study period. Finally, the descriptive statistics for the 
1980-2013 study period are provided in Table 6. 
 The autoregressive 2SLS estimate of equation (4) for the period 1980-2013 is provided in 
Table 7, where estimated coefficients, t-values, and prob. values are provided and where the Newey 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
and West (1986) heteroskedasticity correction has been adopted. In Table 7, all six of the estimated 
coefficients on the explanatory variables exhibit the expected signs, with three of these coefficients 
being statistically significant at the 1% level and one being statistically significant at the 5% level. 
Two of the six coefficients, CHPCRGDPt-1 and MYt-1, fail to be statistically significant at even the 
10% level. The DW statistic is 1.85, so that there is no evidence of an autocorrelation problem. In 
addition, the J-statistic is statistically significant at the 5% level.  
 Thus, once again, it is found that, this time for the period beginning in 1980, the ex post real 
interest rate yield on ten year U.S. Treasury notes is an increasing function of RTHREEt, RBaat, and 
RYTFt-1. In addition, and more relevantly in view of the objective of this study, the ex post real 
interest rate yield on ten year U.S. Treasury notes is found to be an increasing function (at beyond the 
5% statistical significance level) of the federal budget deficit (expressed as a percent of GDP). 
5 Empirical Findings Using Quarterly Data, 1960.1-2013.4 
In this section of the study, the basic model is re-estimated for the 1960-2013 time period using 
quarterly data. The actual study period thus runs from quarter 1960.1 through quarter 2013.4. The 
model being estimated in this case directly parallels that in equation (4) above and is given by: 
RTENt = α0 + α1 TDEFYt + α2 MYt-1 + α3 RBaa t + α4 RTHREEt + α5 RTXFRt-1  
 + α6 CHPRCGDPt-1 + α7 AR (1) + ut       (5) 
where:   
RTENt  = the ex post real average interest rate yield on ten year U.S. Treasury notes in quarter t, 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
expressed as a percent per annum;  
α0 = constant term;  
TDEFYt = the ratio of the nominal federal budget deficit in quarter t to the nominal GDP in quarter 
t, expressed as a percent;  
MYt-1 = the ratio of the average nominal M2 money supply in quarter t-1 to the nominal GDP in 
quarter t-1, expressed as a percent;  
RBaat = the ex post real average interest rate yield on Moody’s Baa-rated corporate bonds in quarter 
t, expressed as a percent annum;  
RTHREEt = the ex post real average interest rate yield on three year U.S. Treasury notes in quarter t, 
expressed as a percent per annum; 
RTXFRt-1 = the ex post real average interest rate yield on high grade municipal bonds in quarter t-1, 
expressed as a percent per annum; 
CHPCRGDPt-1 = the change in per capita real (2005 dollars) GDP over quarter t-1, expressed as an 
annual rate;  
AR (1) = the autoregressive term; and 
ut = the stochastic error term.  
Once again, the group unit root test reveals that the variables in this model are stationary in levels for 
the 1960.1-2013.4 study period. Naturally, the three instruments, RTBRt-2, URt-2, and RGDPGRt-2, 
are values for quarter t-2, with the variables RTBRt-2 and URt-2 each expressed as a percent per 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
annum. 
 The autoregressive 2SLS estimate of equation (5) is provided in Table 8, where estimated 
coefficients, t-values, and prob. values are provided and where the Newey and West (1986) 
heteroskedasticity correction has been adopted. In Table 8, all six of the estimated coefficients on the 
explanatory variables exhibit the expected signs, with four of these coefficients being statistically 
significant at the 1% level and two of the six coefficients, CHPCRGDPt-1 and MYt-1, failing to be 
statistically significant at even the 10% level. The DW statistic is 1.86, so that there is no evidence of 
an autocorrelation problem. In addition, the J-statistic is statistically significant at the 5% level.  
 This autoregressive 2SLS estimate using quarterly data for the 1960.1-2013.4 study period 
reveals that the ex post real interest rate yield on ten year U.S. Treasury notes has been an increasing 
function of the ex post real interest rate yield on Moody’s Baa-rated corporate bonds, the ex post real 
interest rate yield on three year Treasury notes, and the ex post real interest rate yield on high grade 
municipal bonds. This estimate also finds that federal budget deficit (relative to the GDP level) 
exercised a positive and statistically significant impact on the ex post real interest rate yield on ten 
year Treasury notes. Inasmuch as these findings are entirely consistent with the results in this study 
obtained used annual data for the periods 1960-2013, 1971-2013, and 1980-2013, one could interpret 
this estimation as a “soft” robustness test of the initial model.  Finally, it is observed that, in the 
interest of space, the results of quarterly estimates for the periods 1971.3-2013.4 and 1980.1-2013.4 
are not provided here; however, these results are entirely compatible with their counterpart annual 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
results for these corresponding periods.2 
6 Conclusion 
Using over a half century of data, this empirical study adopts a simple loanable funds to investigate 
the impact of the federal budget deficits in the U.S. on the ex post real interest rate yield on ten year 
U.S. Treasury notes. Three estimates using annual data for three different time periods (1960-2013, 
1971-2013, 1980-2013) are provided; in addition, as a de facto modest test of robustness, one 
additional estimate using quarterly data for the period 1960.1 through 2013.4 is also provided. In each 
of the four empirical analyses, an autoregressive 2SLS estimate finds that the ex post real interest rate 
yield on ten year U.S. Treasury notes is an increasing function of the ex post real interest rate yield on 
Moody’s Baa-rated corporate bonds, the ex post real interest rate yield on three year Treasury notes, 
and the ex post real interest rate yield on high grade municipal bonds. This exploratory  analysis also 
finds consistent evidence that federal budget deficit (relative to the GDP level) exercised a positive 
and statistically significant impact on the ex post real interest rate yield on ten year Treasury notes, a 
finding compatible in principle with a number of earlier studies of shorter time periods, such as those 
by Al-Saji (1993), Barth, Iden and Russek (1984, 1985, 1986), Cebula (1997, 2005, 2013), Cebula 
and Cuellar (2010), Findlay (1990), Hoelscher (1986), Kiani (2009), and Saltz (1998), among others.  
 Thus, it appears that factors elevating the federal budget deficit as a percent of GDP act to 
raise the real cost of borrowing to the U.S. Treasury and hence, ultimately, to the U.S. taxpayer (and, 
                     
2 These results are available upon request. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
arguably, vicariously to households in general as well as firms and state and local governments). 
Given the time periods studied, 1960 through 2013 (and 1960.1-2013.4), 1971 through 2013, and 
1980 through 2013, this relationship appears to be an enduring one, one that policy-makers cannot 
afford to overlook in the long run if the private sector of the economy is to grow and prosper to its 
potential. Although this study does not argue that the results obtained here necessarily lead to 
crowding out, certain previous studies finding that budget deficits raise long term interest rates have 
made such an argument (Carlson and Spencer, 1975; Cebula, 1997; Ewing and Yanochik, 1999; Gale 
and Orszag, 2003). The present study takes the broader view that more research is necessary in order 
to link investment in new plant and equipment and other private-sector “candidates” for transactions 
crowding out to federal budget deficits before crowding out claims can hold credibility.  
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics, 1960-2013, Annual Data 
 
Variable  Mean  Standard Deviation 
 
RTENt   2.499  2.284 
 
TDEFYt  2.693  2.604 
 
MYt-1     54.211  7.701 
 
RBaat   4.471  2.415 
 
RTHREEt  1.939  2.049 
 
RTXFRt-1  1.835  2.126 
 
CHPCRGDPt-1  55.20  52.90 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. AR/2SLS Estimation Results, 1960-2013, Annual Data 
Dependent Variable: RTENt 
 
Variable  Coefficient t-value  Prob. 
Constant  -0.147  -0.37  0.7128 
 
TDEFYt   0.091*** 2.76  0.0085  
      
MYt-1     -0.012* -1.68  0.0998   
     
RBaat    0.422*** 3.56  0.0009  
 
RTHREEt  0.511*** 4.02  0.0002  
 
RTXFRt-1  0.076*** 4.90  0.0000 
 
CHPCRGDPt-1 -158.62 -0.28  0.7801    
 
AR (1)   0.559** 3.39  0.0015    
 
N   54 
DW   1.95 
Rho   0.02 
Inverted Root  0.56 
J-statistic**  12.44 
Instrument Rank 14 
 
***statistically significant at the 1% level; **statistically significant at the 5% level; *statistically 
significant at the 10% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Correlation Matrix, Explanatory Variables, 1960-2013, Annual Data 
 
  TDEFY MY RBaa RTHREE   RTXFR CHPCRGDP 
 
TDEFY 1.000 
 
MY  0.460 1.000 
 
RBaa  0.279 0.105 1.000 
 
RTHREE -0.095 -0.215 0.580 1.000 
 
RTXFR 0.267 -0.046 0.559  0.579         1.000  
 
CHPCRGDP 0.354 0.349 0.170  -0.200        0.250 1.000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics, 1971-2013, Annual Data 
 
Variable  Mean  Standard Deviation 
 
RTENt   2.564  2.542 
 
TDEFYt  3.191  2.670 
 
MYt-1     57.04  5.179 
 
RBaat   4.772  2.616 
 
RTHREEt  1.877  2.216 
 
RTXFRt-1  1.948  2.188 
 
CHPCRGDPt-1  58.30  57.55 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. AR/2SLS Estimation Results, 1971-2013, Annual Data 
Dependent Variable: RTENt 
 
Variable  Coefficient t-value  Prob. 
Constant  -0.24  -0.51  0.6118 
 
TDEFYt   0.118*** 2.71  0.0099  
      
MYt-1     -0.009  -1.24  0.2239   
     
RBaat    0.362*** 4.10  0.0002  
 
RTHREEt  0.574*** 5.98  0.0000 
 
RTXFRt-1  0.077*** 4.80  0.0000 
 
CHPCRGDPt-1 -249.98 -0.45  0.6563    
 
AR (1)   0.580*** 4.00  0.0003    
 
N   43 
DW   1.88 
Rho   0.09 
Inverted Root  0.58 
J-statistic**   13.16 
Instrument Rank 14 
 
***statistically significant at the 1% level; **statistically significant at the 5% level; *statistically 
significant at the 10% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6. Descriptive Statistics, 1980-2013, Annual Data 
 
Variable  Mean  Standard Deviation 
 
RTENt   3.168  2.329 
 
TDEFYt  3.441  2.905 
 
MYt-1     55.82  5.066 
 
RBaat   5.480  2.262 
 
RTHREEt  2.372  2.307 
 
RTXFRt-1  2.805  2.017 
 
CHPCRGDPt-1  35.80  6.28 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7. AR/2SLS Estimation Results, 1980-2013, Annual Data 
Dependent Variable: RTENt 
 
Variable  Coefficient t-value  Prob. 
Constant  1.434  0.90  0.3751 
 
TDEFYt   0.138** 2.09  0.0461   
      
MYt-1     -0.038  -1.17  0.2505   
     
RBaat    0.313*** 2.94  0.0067 
 
RTHREEt  0.602*** 6.00  0.0000 
 
RTXFRt-1  0.089*** 6.18  0.0000 
 
CHPCRGDPt-1 -185.82 -0.24  0.8129    
 
AR (1)   0.396*  1.76  0.0905   
 
N   34 
DW   1.85 
Rho   0.07 
Inverted Root  0.40 
J-statistic**   12.84 
Instrument Rank 14 
 
***statistically significant at the 1% level; **statistically significant at the 5% level; *statistically 
significant at the 10% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8. AR/2SLS Estimation Results, 1960.1-2013.4, Quarterly Data 
Dependent Variable: RTENt 
 
Variable  Coefficient t-value  Prob. 
Constant  -0.115  -0.31  0.7549 
 
TDEFYt   0.096*** 3.02  0.0042  
      
MYt-1     -0.008  -1.17  0.2466   
     
RBaat    0.319*** 5.25  0.0000   
 
RTHREEt  0.63*** 9.99  0.0000  
 
RTXFRt-1  0.074*** 4.59  0.0003 
 
CHPCRGDPt-1 -465.43 -1.01  0.3204    
 
AR (1)   0.513*** 3.96  0.0003    
 
N   216 
DW   1.86 
Rho   0.07 
Inverted Root  0.51 
J-statistic**  12.35 
Instrument Rank 15 
 
***statistically significant at the 1% level; **statistically significant at the 5% level; *statistically 
significant at the 10% level. 
 
 
 
